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INTRODUCTION
For the longest time, philosophers and
psychologists have been claiming that people who
observe other people’s actions are prone to simulate
those actions in a more or less rudimentary form – at
least in their minds, but sometimes even with their
bodies (e.g., Carpenter, 1874/1984; Chevreul, 1833;
Goldman, 2002; James, 1890; Liberman et al., 1967;
Smith, 1759/1976; Ueberwasser, 1787). In order to
avoid confusions with broader uses of the concept of
simulation in cognitive theorizing (e.g., Grush, 2003;
Hesslow, 2002; Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001;
Wolpert and Kawato, 1998) I will here use the term
of re-enactment to address the specific notion that
the perception of certain actions and their outcomes
(performed by others) may induce the production of
related actions (performed by the perceiver herself). 
Whereas much of the classical literature is based
on anecdotal evidence the notion of re-enactment
has recently gained more systematic support from
behavioural and neurophysiological studies. For
instance, behavioural studies of action induction
have provided insight into basic functional
principles underlying overt re-enactment (Knuf et
al., 2001; De Maeght and Prinz, 2004; Prinz et al.,
2005; Prinz, 1987). Likewise, neurophysiological
studies have identified populations of neurons at
various brain sites that exhibit mirror-like
properties. These neurons are involved in both,
perceiving certain actions in others and performing
those actions oneself (for overviews, see Gallese et
al., 2002; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti, 2004). 
WHAT FOR?
The question I wish to address here is what re-
enactment is good for. If observing certain actions
indeed goes along with (covertly or overtly) re-
enacting them – what does such re-enacting earn
the observer? I will briefly discuss the merits of
three answers that have been proposed: imitation,
identification, and anticipation.
Imitation
At first glance it may appear to be plausible
that mirror systems should be built into animals’
brains and minds for the sake of imitation: If parts
of the neural structures in charge of the perception
of others’ actions coincide with structures in charge
of the production of those actions, then imitation of
other individuals’ actions may come for free just as
a by-product of perceiving them. This idea was
initially promoted by some researchers after the
first discoveries on mirror neurons had been made.
Yet, attractive as it appeared at first glance, it was
soon abandoned for two major reasons. First, as
Rizzolatti et al. (2001) had pointed out from the
beginning, monkeys don’t ape. Though they do
dispose of a rich mirror system in their premotor
cortex, they do not imitate – suggesting that the
mirror system must be good for something else.
Second, mirror activity and re-enactment appear to
be mandatory consequences of action perception,
whereas imitation – whenever it occurs in humans
(and other primates) – is extremely context-bound.
True, humans and primates are capable of imitating
certain actions they observe – but they certainly
don’t do it all day long as one would have to
expect if imitation were to follow from mirror-
neuron activity. In fact, if they did so, they would
have to count as endangered species. Their fitness
will be much more dependent on their ability to
respond to foreign action through own
complementary action than through own imitation. 
In sum, it is not likely that the architecture for
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re-enactment has been built into our brains and
minds for the sake of imitation – of course, this
does not preclude that re-enactment may subserve
imitation whenever it occurs. 
Identification
The second suggestion is that re-enactment
subserves the perceptual identification of action.
For instance, Rizzolatti et al. (2001) hold “… that
we understand actions when we map the visual
representation of the observed action onto our
motor representation of the same action. An action
is understood when its observation causes the
motor system of the observer to ‘resonate’” (p.
661). Intuitively appealing as these statements may
appear, it is not overly clear what they actually
imply. There are two questions here. First: What
does it mean to understand an action?
Understanding an action will usually entail more
than mere identification of the spatio-temporal
pattern of its underlying body movements. To
understand an action is more than that; it goes
beyond the physics of the movements and captures
the semantics of the act in terms of meaning, goal,
and/or underlying intentions. This is what mirror
neurons actually seem to do: They respond to
classes of actions that share a common goal (like,
e.g., grasping an object), but differ in physical
details of the movements involved– suggesting
that, for these neurons, the semantics of actions is
more relevant than the physics of the underlying
movements. Second: How could re-enactment
subserve action understanding? Here, I believe we
encounter a logical problem that cannot easily be
overcome. The problem is how the appropriate re-
enactment gets selected. Choosing an appropriate
re-enactment for a given action will always require
that the action be identified in the first place. In
other words, the identification of both, the action’s
physical and semantic features needs to be
completed before the appropriate re-enactment can
be run. Running the appropriate re-enactment can
only be a later addition to the action’s preceding
identification. It will certainly add new information
to the resulting representation of that action, but it
cannot contribute to its initial identification. 
In principle, the same argument holds if one
assumes that re-enactment is involved earlier on,
i.e. at processing stages that precede full
identification. For instance, if one thinks of re-
enactment occurring at the level of automatic
priming of candidates for later identification, it is
still true that such re-enactment is completely
dependent on visual coding: At this level, too, the
principle holds that you can only re-enact what you
have visually identified in the first place.
Therefore, I do not see how the claim that re-
enactment subserves action identification and
understanding can be maintained – at least not if
understanding an action is strictly taken to refer to
assessing the identity of ongoing action (see
below). 
Anticipation
If this is true, re-enactment does not subserve
the process of identification, but it does enrich its
outcome. The third answer believes that this
enrichment, though it may be redundant with
respect to assessing the identity of ongoing action,
does play an important role for anticipating the
further course of that action. In other words, re-
enactment does not so much help the perceiver to
understand what the other is already doing, but
rather to anticipate what s/he is going to do next.
Related views have recently been advanced by, for
example, Chaminade et al. (2001), Grush (2003),
Schubotz and von Cramon (2001, 2002), Verfaillie
and Daems (2002), and Wilson (2001, 2005). To be
sure, the claim is not that action anticipation
requires re-enactment on any logical ground. In
principle, such extrapolations could also be
computed by those representational systems that
identify the action in the first place and code for its
physical and semantic features. However, there is a
crucial advantage of leaving the job of anticipation
to the motor system. Motor systems are engineered
as anticipation devices (c.f., e.g., Desmurget and
Grafton, 2000; Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001; Jordan
and Wolpert, 1999). The efficiency of action
planning and control is critically dependent on the
system’s capability of predicting the sensory
consequences of planned movements (forward
models). Hence, motor systems are engineered for
anticipating the consequences of the movements
they plan for their own body. Thus, when they
become engaged in action perception, that capacity
is applied and extended to movements perceived in
other bodies. 
According to this view, re-enactment exploits
the motor system’s anticipatory potential for the
prediction of upcoming action. The proper function
of re-enactment is not to identify what is going on
(let alone imitate it), but to anticipate what comes
next.
CONCLUDING REMARK
For social animals like we are, the capacity to
anticipate what our conspecifics are going to do is,
of course, of crucial importance in terms of
survival and fitness. In a way, one could perhaps
argue that anticipating what others are doing next
is an essential constituent of understanding what
they are doing now. The proof of really
understanding what is going on now will often be
in knowing what comes next. For instance, when a
predator hunts for a prey, there is no real dividing
line between understanding what the prey is doing
in this moment and anticipating what it is going to
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do next. Rather, the perception of the oncoming
action seems to imply the anticipation of upcoming
action. Thus, if we broaden our notion of what it
means to understand an action to encompass both,
identification of ongoing and anticipation of
upcoming action, then our specific proposal (i.e.,
re-enactment subserves anticipation) is even
compatible with Rizzolatti’s (2004; Rizzolatti et al.,
2001)  general claim that re-enactment subserves
action understanding. Understanding requires
knowing what comes next – and this is what re-
enactment earns us. 
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